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Abstract 
The Chinese banking system, characterized by massive government intervention, poor 
asset quality and low capitalization, has started a reform process based on three main 
pillars: (i) bank restructuring, through the cleaning-up of non-performing loans and public 
capital injections, particularly in the four largest state-owned banks; (ii) financial liberalization, 
with the gradual flexibilization of quantity and price controls, the opening-up to foreign 
competition and cautious steps toward capital account liberalization; and (iii) strengthened 
financial regulation and supervision, coupled with efforts to improve corporate governance 
and transparency. Although the reform is still ongoing, our preliminary assessment indicates 
that changes are needed for the reform to be fully successful. Asset quality has improved, 
particularly in the recapitalized banks, but there is a high risk of a new build-up of non 
performing loans. Capitalization has increased in the largest banks, as a consequence of the 
government capital injections, but it generally remains low and profitability has fallen even 
further. China’s huge financing needs, to maintain high economic growth, and its commitment 
to fully open up its banking system to foreign competition urgently require a more 
comprehensive and time-bound strategy, with a long-term vision of the desired structure of 
the Chinese banking system. Bank recapitalization should be completed immediately, not only 
to ensure bank soundness, but also to increase profitability, which could be affected 
negatively as competition increases with full financial liberalization. Bank recapitalization, 
however, needs to be accompanied by a radical improvement in corporate governance, 
which would clearly be facilitated by a change in the property structure. 
 
 
Key Words: Chinese financial system, financial reform, bank restructuring, financial 
liberalization, bank regulation and supervision. 
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1 Introduction 
China’s very high and stable growth in the last few years would seem to indicate that 
the country is a success in all regards, including finance. This optimistic picture, however, 
may change if we consider the extremely high domestic saving and investment ratios. 
In fact, for an average 40% domestic investment to GDP (fully financed by domestic savings), 
an 8 to 10% growth is not such a high return to investment. This is a very rough indicator of 
potential misallocation of resources, namely domestic savings, which has been a common 
feature of closed economies, and even more so of planned ones. 
 
The Chinese authorities are in the process of transforming a planned economy into a 
market-based one. There are several reasons to believe that this process may have 
consequences not only for China but also for the rest of the word. First, China has one fourth 
of the world’s population and 12.5% of its GDP measured in terms of purchasing power 
parity (PPP). Second, its economy is expected to become even larger; for some even the 
biggest worldwide by 2050 [Wilson and Purushothaman (2003)]. Third, it is one of the main 
exporters of capital, which is now mainly directed to financing the US current account deficit. 
 
In this study, we concentrate on the banking sector for three reasons. First, it is the 
most important player of the Chinese financial system, although capital markets are also 
growing fast. In 2004, bank loans represented 83% of the funds raised by the non-financial 
sector, while stocks were only 5% and bonds 12% (11% for government bonds and 1% 
corporate ones). Second, the banking system is the main financer of non profitable 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) so that bank reform will have a direct impact on SOEs. Third, 
the Chinese banking system is so large that the way in which the reform is resolved could 
have systemic consequences. One can think of several –albeit unlikely– scenarios for such 
consequences. One is a banking crisis, particularly in the aftermath of capital account 
liberalization, which could affect capital flows elsewhere in the world. Another one would 
be that a number of foreign banks gain control of China’s largest banks, which rank among 
the largest in the world. This might induce a reshaping of international banks’ position 
worldwide and, perhaps, even a change in their interest towards other emerging economies.  
 
This paper describes and assesses China’s ongoing banking reform as well as the 
potential impact of remaining measures, so as to draw conclusions and recommendations, 
which may be of interest for policy makers. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the structure and evolution of 
the Chinese banking system is briefly described as well as the main reasons for its 
poor performance. Section 3 summarizes the main steps taken towards financial reform, 
distinguishing between bank restructuring, financial liberalization and bank regulation and 
supervision. Section 4 evaluates the impact of the reform on bank performance so far as 
well as the potential consequences of remaining steps. Finally, in Section 5, we draw 
conclusions and policy recommendations based on our evaluation of the reform. 
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2 The Chinese Bank System 
In this section, we review the main features characterizing China’s banking system so as to 
better understand and assess the steps taken to its reform. 
 
The first striking feature is the large size of the banking system not only in relative 
terms but also in absolute ones. China ranked seventh, worldwide, in terms of bank credit to 
the private sector as a percentage of GDP (Graph A-1 in Appendix 1) and sixth in terms of 
bank credit in USD (Graph A-2 in Appendix 1). Furthermore, bank credit continues to growth 
at a brisk rate, pushed by buoyant economic growth. However, this does not imply a very 
developed banking system since penetration of banking products is low and bank credit for 
small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) and households is scarce, 15% and 11% of total 
loans, respectively, in 2004. 
 
Second, as many transition economies, the Chinese banking system has been 
dominated by four very large state owned commercial banks (SOCBs), which were created 
in the 1980s to grant credit to key sectors and are now commercial banks concentrated in 
corporate lending (appendix 2 offers an overview of the institutional setting of the Chinese 
banking system and the different types of banks). The remaining banks are relatively small, 
which explains why the degree of concentration is relatively high when measured in terms 
of the share of assets of the four largest banks (see m4 in Chart 1 below) but much 
lower measured by the Herfindahl index. The relatively low Herfindahl index, however, 
does not imply strong competition in the banking system, given the oligopolistic behaviour 
of the SOCBs, the still massive government intervention and the ample room for growth 
that the strong demand for credit has offered to all banks. A proof of the scarce competition 
is the relatively high interest margin as a percentage of total assets (1.79% in 2003 as 
opposed to 1.38% for EU banks). Things seem to be starting to change with the 
decreasing weight of SOCBs in the banking system (with 73.9% of total assets in 1993 
and 54.6% in 2004) and the rising importance of other commercial banks, such as Joint 
Stock Commercial Banks (JSCBs) and City Commercial Banks (CCBs). The former, partially 
owned by local governments and SOEs and with a growing share of private ownership 
(sometimes foreign), now hold 15% of total bank assets, as compared to 4.4% in 1993. 
CCBs, created by restructuring and merging urban credit cooperatives, are much smaller, 
with a 5.4% share in 2004 (Table A-1 in Appendix 1 shows the evolution of asset share for 
each type of institution). This rapid change in asset share is mainly driven by a 30% yearly 
growth in JSCBs’ assets, as opposed to 10% for SOCBs. 
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Chart 1. Concentration of Chinese Banking Sector 
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 The third characteristic is the rather peculiar structure of the balance sheet, 
compared to international standards. First, loans are a large part of the assets (60.8% in 2003 
as shown in Chart 2 below), the majority of which is granted to the corporate sector (over 
85% of total loans and over 85% of profits) and to a large –although decreasing– extent short 
term. In fact, still nearly 50% of total loans go to finance industrial projects in a revolving 
manner (Table A-4 in Appendix 1). This is particularly the case of policy banks, created 
in 1994 as state-owned development banks, with 92% of assets in loans. The recent boom in 
the housing sector has not changed this picture yet; mortgage lending is still less than 15% of 
total loans, but also of new loans as shown in Graph 3 below). Second, almost all liabilities are 
deposits, with an average share of 89% in 2003. This is even higher in SOCBs (92%) but 
much less so for JSCBs (79%), which have used non interest bearing funding. Retail 
depositors are the main financers of the banking system since corporate deposits only 
represented one third of the total. (Tables A-2, A-3 and A-4 in Appendix 1). Again, large 
differences exist among types of banks since retail depositors represent 60% of total deposits 
for SOCBs and corporate deposits 65% for JSCBs. 
Chart 2 
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Chart 3. Composition of New Loans  
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 The fourth feature of Chinese banks, also rather common in transition economies, 
has been their very poor asset quality. The ratio of NPLs to total loans was 20% in 2003 
(see Table 1 below), well above international standards (3.1% for EU banks in the same year) 
and was even larger before the Chinese authorities started their restructuring (above 30% 
in 1997 according to the CBRC). Also provisioning, as a percentage of non-performing 
loans (NPLs), was well below international standards, namely less than 22%1, as compared 
to 67.4% in the EU in 2003. The underlying reasons for such poor asset quality are 
soft-budget constraints for the lending to SOEs but also a weak credit culture. In fact, 
the latter explains why NPLs from small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) and household 
lending are also high for international standards. Finally, capitalization is low. The solvency 
ratio, calculated according to Basel I, was only 6.73%2 in 2003 (as shown in Chart 4 below) 
and the ratio of equity to assets was 4.3%, virtually the same as before the reform started 
(Table A-5 in Appendix 1 shows the evolution of basic indicators of bank performance for 
each bank group). 
 
                                                                          
1. Due to data limitations, this ratio has been calculated for three of the four SOCBs (i.e., excluding the Agricultural 
Bank of China), and ten of the twelve JSCBs. 
2. Ibid. 
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Table 1. Reported NPLs in Chinese financial system 
as of USD billion
NPL ratio
(% of total 
loans)
% of GDP (1)
State owned commercial banks dic-03 232 20 17
Joint Stock Commercial Banks mar-04 23 7 2
Policy Banks jun-03 19 18 1
Credit cooperatives mar-04 60 30 4
Banking system total dic-03 373 19 28
Asset management companies dic-03 107 - 8
Financial system total mar-04 480 - 36
(1) June 2003 annual GDP
Source: Authors' own estimations based on official figures reported by Bofit (2004), Ernst & Young (2004), Ping (2003) and Pei 
& Shirai (2004).
 
Chart 4 
1 According to Basel I. Total and SOCBs figures are assesed excluding ABC due to data limitations
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A fifth characteristic is very poor profitability. In 2003, the return on average equity 
(ROAE) of the banking system was 3.05% (see Chart 5 below), and the return on average 
assets (ROAA) was 0.14%, well below international standards. As an example, EU banks had 
9.87% ROAE and 0.41% ROAA in the same year.  
Chart 5  
(*) Considering all commercial banks in EU-15
Source: Bankscope
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The main reason for the low profitability seems to be asset quality. Operating 
income, as a percentage of total assets, is only slightly lower for Chinese banks than for 
European ones (2.22% compared to 2.38% in 2003, as shown in Chart 6 below), albeit very 
different in composition. In fact, Chinese banks have a much lower non-interest income than 
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European ones (see Chart 7 below). In addition, the efficiency of Chinese banks, measured by 
the cost to income, is actually better, (51.68% compared to 60.39% in the same year), 
although it is basically explained by low wages. In fact, other measures of efficiency, such as 
pre-provision profit over employees generally ranks EU banks better than Chinese. The 
difference in profitability is, therefore, mainly explained by the much larger amounts of 
provisions and write-offs, stemming from the very low asset quality. In fact, provisions and 
write-offs reduce Chinese banks’ net income to only 11.7% of pre-provision profits in 2003, 
compared to 43.6% for EU banks. Tables A-2, A-3 and A-6 in Appendix 1 depict the 
evolution of assets, liabilities and income and expenditure for different types of Chinese 
banks. 
Chart 6  
(*) Considering all commercial banks in EU-15
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Chart 7 
(*) Considering all commercial banks in EU-15
Source: Bankscope
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Sixth, corporate governance is very weak. The root of this problem is government 
intervention, which inhibits banks allocating their assets according to market criteria. This is 
particularly true for the SOCBs. SOCBs lack the basic attributes of a profit making bank. 
In fact, they do not have clearly identifiable owners, or, until very recently, board of directors 
or specialized organs for monitoring management. They only have an external board of 
supervisors –as all Chinese companies– which monitors conformity with banking law 
and regulations but has no role in the governance or oversight of bank management. Banks 
are accountable only to the government (usually the Ministry of Finance) and disclosure 
requirements are minimal. Finally, management has traditionally been selected from the 
ministerial system and has remained subject to the close control of the party. JSCBs do not 
have the same legacy as SOCBs so that their management has a higher commitment to 
shareholder value although they are still very much influenced by local governments and 
government-controlled enterprises given their large participation in the capital of most of these 
institutions. JSCBs have also introduced improvements in the procedures for granting credit 
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and risk management. Some of the largest CCBs are in a similar position to JSCBs, but not 
the small ones which still resemble to urban credit cooperatives. Credit cooperatives are 
characterized by even weaker governance that SOCBs, since they are subject to the direct 
control from local governments. 
 
The last characteristic is the poor institutional framework of the banking system. This 
is featured by a rather loose regulation and supervision, particularly as regards enforcement. 
Furthermore, the regulatory bodies, as well as the central bank, are dependent on the party’s 
decisions. The lack of enforcement power from the supervisory part helps explain the very 
limited improvement in corporate governance. Additional weaknesses are the lack of a 
bankruptcy law, a national credit bureau and a smooth functioning of the payment systems. 
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3 Steps taken in banking reform 
The reform of the Chinese banking system started with an institutional shake-up, as was 
generally the case in transition economies. The first, and foremost important step, was the 
substitution, in 1984 of a monobank system with a multi-tiered one, in which central banking 
functions were separated from the rest. The second step was the separation of commercial 
banking activities from those specially geared towards economic development. To this end, 
policy lending banks were established in 1994 in order to take over from SOCBs projects 
for development purposes and a new Commercial Banking Law was approved in 1995 to 
regulate commercial banks. Third, the institutional design of the People’s Bank of China (PBC) 
was strengthened through a new charter in 1995, where its three main responsibilities were: 
monetary stability, banking supervision, and oversight of the payments system. The new 
charter, however, did not grant the PBC independence from the State Council. Finally, 
responsibilities for monetary policy and banking supervision were separated with the creation 
of the Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) in 2003. 
 
In addition to the institutional shake-up, China’s bank reform has been based upon 
three main pillars (i) bank restructuring, through the cleaning up of NPLs, and recapitalization; 
(ii) the reduction of government interference in the system, through quantity and price 
liberalization as well as the opening up to foreign competition; and (iii) improved regulation and 
supervision. 
3.1 Restructuring 
Bank restructuring has probably been the most important pillar of bank reform since poor 
asset quality, coupled with very low capitalization, was a very pressing problem. Bank 
restructuring has, until now, mainly focused on SOCBs but there have also been some 
measures for credit cooperatives. This section concentrates on SOCBs, given their systemic 
natures. The SOCBs’ restructuring process has not been linear but in waves. Three can be 
clearly identified, each of which with two clearly differentiated steps: first a capital injection 
and, second, the clean-up of NPLs. 
3.1.1 THE THREE RESTRUCTURING WAVES FOR SOCBS 
The first wave started in 1998, with an injection of the equivalent of USD 33 billion in 
Renminbi (RMB) into the four SOCBs. The operation started with a reduction in the reserve 
requirement which freed liquidity for the banks to acquire government paper. The government 
transferred again the receipts of this purchase to these banks in the formal of fresh capital. 
This operation was followed, in 1999-2000, by the transfer –at book value– of NPLs from 
the four SOCBs3 to the four newly created Asset Management Companies (AMCs) for the 
equivalent of USD 170 billion (more details will be given on the functioning of these AMCs in 
the next section). 
 
The second wave started in December 2003 with 22.5 billion USD capital injections 
in the two best performing SOCBs, namely China Construction Bank (CCB) and Bank of 
China (BoC)4. These injections came directly from the country’s official international reserves, 
through the transfer of rights of ownership of US government bonds. These have not been 
converted into RMB yet because of imposed restrictions. Since each bank’s existing capital 
was mainly used to provision or write-off the equivalent of 23.4 billion USD in NPLs, this 
                                                                          
3. NPLs were also transferred from one policy bank (China Development Bank). 
4. Table A-7 in Appendix 1 gives details of NPLs at each SOCB. 
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operation led to a very marginal increase in capitalization while asset quality did improve 
substantially. In June 2004, the equivalent of 15.6 billion and 18.1 billion USD in NPLs was 
auctioned from CCB and BoC, respectively, to AMCs at 50% of face value. The provisions 
accumulated with the capital injections were used to write-off the other 50% of the value. 
Cynda, the most active AMC won the auction by promising a 30% recovery rate. In addition, 
CCB and BoC increased their Tier II capital by issuing subordinated debt for the equivalent 
of 4.8 billion and 7.3 billion USD, respectively. Finally, the listing of part of these two banks’ 
share has been announced for the second half of 20055 and a state-owned investment 
company has been created to organize the listing. Chinese authorities have expressed 
interest in strategic investors entering these banks’ capital in order to diversify ownership 
and improve management quality. This has been shown by Bank of America’s recent 
acquisition of a 9% stake of CCB (amounting to 2.5 billion USD), before the actual listing. This 
has been followed by an additional 1 billion USD stake in CCB by Singapore’s state-owned 
financial holding, Temasek. 
 
The third restructuring wave started in April 2005 with the injection of 15 billion USD 
into the Industrial Commercial Bank (ICB). As for the second wave, these funds came 
from the official international reserves and have not been converted into RMB. Although 
the share of NPLs in this bank is much larger than in the previously restructured 
ones, only 9 billion USD of the previous capital was used to provision NPLs while the 
remaining 15 billion was retained in equity (i.e., total equity is now 30 billion USD). The 
restructuring continued in June 2005 with the approval of an NPL disposal of 85.5 billion USD 
to AMCs and the issuance of 12.1 billion USD in subordinated debt. In the same way as CCB 
and BoC did, ICBC plans to be listed in 2006 or 2007.6 
 
In these three waves, an estimated 20 to 24% of the 2004 GDP has been injected in 
the banking system7, either as capital or as a substitute of NPLs. This amounts to over 110% 
of SOCBs’ capital in injections. 
3.1.2 THE NPLS’ DISPOSAL 
As previously mentioned, the Chinese authorities established a number of AMCs where NPLs 
from SOCBs have been transferred, and their staff seconded. AMCs are legally independent 
agencies with a very broad mandate, namely collecting NPLs, restructuring them or 
converting them into equity. They are also responsible for issuing bonds and borrowing from 
financial institutions to pay for the NPLs they receive. Finally, they are also in charge of 
restructuring SOEs and recommending companies for listing [Pei and Shirai (2004)]. 
 
The original idea was to assign one AMC for each SOCB. The separation of NPLs 
recoveries depending on the bank of origin was preferred by the Chinese authorities 
for several reasons. First, the average size of loans seemed to be small and the clients 
widely dispersed, making the recovery of NPLs more cumbersome. Second, the 
specialization of SOCBs, at least in their origin, meant that economies of scale could be rather 
limited8. In reality, banks are no longer as specialized as they use to be and loans are 
sometimes very large, which might explain why this separate model has evolved into an 
auction, where AMCs bid to receive additional NPLs. 
                                                                          
5. Although not officially confirmed, the stock exchange chosen will probable be Hong Kong and not New York. In 
addition, there have been rumours that the listing of BoC will be postponed until 2006. 
6. The transfer of NPLs to an AMC and the issuance of subordinated debt are still pending. 
7. If we assume that the purchase of NPLs in the third wave (i.e. from ICB) is carried out at face value as in the first 
restructuring wave, the estimated cost is 23.5% of 2004 GDP. If it is done at 50% value as in the second wave, the 
cost goes down to 20.7% of GDP. 
8. For this reason, the main staff members of each AMC are generally seconded from the relevant SOCB. 
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In the first restructuring wave, each AMC received NPLs from its respective SOCB at 
face value for a total amount equivalent to 8% of GDP (see Table 3 below) and issued 
a 10 year bond with an annual 2.25% coupon for 83% of that amount and paid the 
remaining 17% in cash. In the second restructuring wave, auctions have been used to 
transfer NPLs. The action implied that the highest bidding AMCs, in terms of recovery value, 
namely Cynda, received the NPLs. In the third wave, the NPLs of ICBC are being transferred 
to one of the AMCs (Huarong). This will issue a claim to cover the full face value of the 
loans with no specific maturity and an annual fixed rate of 3%. In this case the Ministry of 
Finance seems to have taken the responsibility of covering the shortfall of revenues with the 
income taxes and dividends of ICBC. 
 
Excluding the third wave, which is still ongoing, the amount of NPLs which has 
been restructured or disposed of hovers around 50% of total loans transferred. From the 
restructured (resolved) loans, only 20% of their nominal value has been cashed, which implies 
that only 10% of the nominal value of the NPLs transferred has been recovered. Only a 
marginal part of these NPLs has been securitized or purchased by foreign investors. Finally, 
the government has set the end of 2006 as deadline for the AMCs to work out all NPLs. 
 
Table 2. AMCs disposal of NPLs at March-2005 
AMC SOCB Assets 
transferred 
(USD billions)
Share of banks 
loans outstanding 
(% at end-1998)
NPL resolved % NPL 
resolved
Cash 
recovery
% Cash 
recovery
Orient Asset Management BoC 32.3 20.4 12.9 39.9 2.9 22.8
Great Wall Asset Management ABC 41.8 24.6 25.8 61.8 2.7 10.4
Cinda Asset Management CCB 45,0 21.7 18.56 41.2 6.2 33.6
Huarong Asset Management ICBC 49.2 17.9 25.9 52.6 5.1 19.9
Total 168.3 20.7 83.2 49.4 16.9 20.5
Note: in USD billions at March-2005
Source: PBC, CRBC, Annual reports, BIS working paper No.115
 
 
3.1.3 OTHER RESTRUCTURING EFFORTS 
The other restructuring steps taken by the Chinese authorities concern the small financial 
institutions. Credit cooperatives, as well as Trust and Investment Corporations, underwent a 
consolidation from 2000 to 2002 through closures and mergers at the provincial level. In 
August 2003, given the undercapitalization of rural cooperatives and their incapability to 
rejuvenate the rural economy, additional measures were introduced with a pilot project which 
has recently been extended to most Chinese provinces. In particular, credit cooperatives 
were given specific milestone objectives which, if complied with, would allow them to receive 
new capital injections, as well as tax-breaks and subsidies, from the PBC or the local 
government. Until now, the amount of government funds injected into credit cooperatives 
hovers around 10 billion USD. 
 
Notwithstanding the restructuring, the government control on the credit allowances 
to farmers remains tight, given the importance attached to raising rural income. The second 
programmed step is the restructuring of credit cooperatives is clarifying their ownership 
structure and improving their management capacity. The longer-term objective is the 
consolidation of credit cooperatives to no more than 2,000 (from over 32,000 at end-2004) 
reaching the necessary capitalization level and providing enough credit to the rural sector.  
 
In parallel to the credit cooperatives, the CBRC announced it would move ahead 
with the reforms of other types of financial institutions, including policy banks and AMCs. 
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As for AMCs, foreign firms will be allowed to compete with, and ultimately buy stakes in, 
China’s AMCs. 
3.2 Financial liberalization 
Financial liberalization is another important pillar of bank reform in China. Having been a 
planned economy for so long, government intervention in the Chinese banking system was 
massive and still is, in certain aspects. Liberalization efforts have gone in several directions: 
first, introducing market practices in the functioning of the banking system; second, freeing 
interest rates; third opening up to foreign competition; and, finally, liberalizing exchange rate 
controls, which affect banks’ transactions with the rest of the world. 
3.2.1 INTRODUCING MARKET PRACTICES 
Reducing government intervention in the banking system started in the 1990s with a number 
of different actions. An important one was the reduction of reserve requirements from 20% 
to 8% in 1998 and again to 6% in 1999. In addition, the remuneration of excess reserves 
was lowered to discourage banks from hoarding liquid assets and encourage them to 
manage their assets. The last reduction took place in March 2005 (from 1.62% to 0.99%). 
This has implied a steady reduction in liquid assets although they still remain at relatively high 
levels (Table A-2 in Appendix 1). 
 
In parallel, SOCBs were given more responsibility for their lending decisions and 
some of their credit quotas were removed. Another important step was taken in 1999, when 
government interference in commercial lending was forbidden, at least in formal terms, and 
private capital was allowed to enter JSCBs and CCBs. 
3.2.2 INTEREST RATE LIBERALIZATION 
Interest rate liberalization is an important element of China’s efforts to enhance the role of 
market forces in resource allocation. It is also a prerequisite for increasing the 
competitiveness of financial institutions, introducing market-based monetary instruments and 
improving the monetary transmission mechanism. 
 
The approach towards interest rate liberalization has been gradual and is not yet 
completed. As for the sequencing, interest rates in money markets and bond markets were 
liberalized first, followed by the gradual liberalization of the interest rates of loans and, only 
later, deposits. The very first measure was taken in 1996, when interest rates in the inter-bank 
market were liberalized. In 1997, the interest rate in the bond repo market was also freed 
from controls and the issuing rate of government bonds started to be determined by market 
forces in 1998. Controls on foreign currency lending rates and large-value foreign currency 
deposit rates started to be removed in 2000. As for domestic currency transactions, a 
corridor was established in 1996 for RMB loans, which was gradually widened until the 
upper limit was lifted in October 2004, except for credit cooperatives. In 1999, interest rates 
on long-term large-value RMB deposits started to be liberalized on a gradual basis. 
In October 2004 the lower limit on the interest rate of all RMB deposits was lifted but not the 
upper limit (Table A-8 in Appendix 1 offers additional details on interest rate liberalization). 
The PBC has announced additional measures, such as eliminating the upper limit on RMB 
loans for credit cooperatives and abolishing the existing lower limit on lending rates for all 
institutions; It also intends to eliminate the upper limit for all RMB deposits and liberalize 
interest rates on remaining foreign currency deposits (small-value with maturity less than 
one year) at some point in time. In this context, the PBC has also announced the introduction 
of market-based monetary policy instruments. 
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In the current setting, the liberalization of the ceiling on the lending rate and the floor 
on the deposit rate imply no limit as to how large the spread between the lending and deposit 
rate but a clear one on how small it can be, i.e., the difference between the reference lending 
and deposit rates. This difference hovers at 330 basis points (Chart 8 below) and offers a safe 
margin for banks to maintain a relatively high net interest margin. 
 
 
Chart 8. Lending and deposit rates 
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At the same time, nominal lending and deposit rates have fallen substantially in the 
last few years together with real lending rates, which had reached relatively high levels in 
the first compasses of the reform, as double-digit inflation was being controlled. In late 2004, 
real lending rates have started to increase again, as a consequence of a more restrictive 
monetary policy stance, but still remain relatively low, well below 4% (Chart 9 below). 
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Chart 9. Real interest rates on loans (reference) 
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3.2.3 OPENING UP TO FOREIGN COMPETITION 
A crucial milestone in the financial liberalization process was the conclusion of the 
negotiations for China’s accession to the WTO, in late 2001. The commitments agreed 
under WTO imply the full opening up of the Chinese banking system to foreign affiliates by 
end-2006 but the approach followed has been very gradual and cautious. At the beginning, 
foreign banks were only allowed to carry out foreign-currency transactions. As a second 
step, foreign banks were authorized to offer local currency services to foreign enterprises 
and individuals, albeit with geographical restrictions (starting with the richest regions9), high 
minimum capital requirements and tight prudential norms, compared with international 
standards (see Table 3 below). Third, in 2003, the wholesale market in domestic currency 
(i.e., to Chinese enterprises) was opened to foreign competition for a relatively large number 
of provinces. Finally, from end 2006 onwards, foreign banks will be able to offer all banking 
services in local currency in all provinces and even to Chinese households. In addition, the 
Chinese authorities have recently announced measures to facilitate the entry of foreign 
affiliates, such as lifting the ban to open more than one branch per year and reducing 
minimum set up capital requirements for the establishment of new branch. Since the 
signing of WTO in 2001 foreign bank branches have increased from 157 to 192 in 2004, most 
of which from Asian origin (mostly Taiwan, South Korea and Hong Kong). The number of 
representative offices also rose from 184 in 2001 to 223 in 2004. 
 
                                                                          
9. In Shanghai and Shenzhen, as special economic areas, interest rates were liberalized for foreign companies and 
individuals even before becoming a WTO member, in 1996. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 22 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 0502 
Table 3. Timetable for opening the financial sector under WTO commitments 
By Geography
Foreign companies 
and foreign 
individuals
Chinese domestic 
companies
Chinese individuals 
Open Shanghai, Shenzen 1996 2003 2006
Open Tianjing, Dalian 2001 2003 2006
Open Guangzho, Qingdao, Nanjing, Wuhan 2002 2003 2006
Open Jinan, Fuzhou, Chengdu, Chongqing 2003 2003 2006
Open Kunming, Zhuhai, Beijing, Amoy 2004 2004 2006
Open Swatow, Ningbo, Shenyang, Xian 2005 2005 2006
Lift all geographical restrictions 2006 2006 2006
Source: WTO and Deutsche Bank Reasearch (2004)
Banking services in foreign currency were liberalized in all regions immediately after WTO accession
Foreign banks can begin to offer services in domestic 
currency to
 
 
Although WTO commitments do not deal directly with a foreign acquisition of a stake 
from a Chinese bank, Chinese authorities have increases the limit on bank’s foreign 
ownership from 15% to 20% of total capital for one single investor, and to 25% for the joint 
participation of all foreign investors. This is probably related to the need for fresh capital and 
highly qualified bank management. Twelve foreign banks have already entered the capital 
of Chinese banks but their participation is generally low10. Table A-9 in Appendix 1 offers a list 
of the purchases by foreigners and their capital share. 
3.2.4 CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION 
Capital account liberalization has been even more gradual and remains more incomplete 
than the rest of the liberalization process. Although more details are offered in Tables A-10 
and A-11 in Appendix 1, the situation, in a nutshell, is that capital inflows are much more 
liberalized than outflows. FDI abroad, portfolio outflows and even the repayment of credit 
operations need to be authorized by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). 
This, together with the fact that resident transactions in foreign currency are strongly 
regulated, explains why Chinese institutions, including banks, have limited foreign exchange 
positions although they appear to have increased very fast in the last few years, above 50% 
on average (see Table 4 below). Banks’ are long in foreign currency, with net foreign 
assets equivalent to 6.1% of GDP in 2003, while corporate are short, with net foreign liabilities 
equivalent to 10.8% in 2003.11 
 
                                                                          
10. There is one case in which participation is actually above the 20% limit. 
11. Households can only be long since they can deposit money in foreign currency but not borrowed. There is a global 
limit for households’ deposits in foreign currency, namely 5% of total deposits. 
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Table 4. China: Foreign Currency Exposures of Financial and Corporate Sectors 
2001 2002 2003
Net foreign exchange-denominated assets of the banking system (1) 31 60 67
   Of which, net foreign assets 85 108 85
   (in percent of GDP) 7.3 8.5 6.1
   Net domestic foreign currency assets -54 -48 -19
Banks’ foreign currency loans to domestic residents 81 103 130
   (in percent of GDP) 6.9 8.1 9.2
Net foreign currency exposure of corporate sector -103 -121 -150
   Corporates' foreign currency assets (2) 45 52 52
   Corporates' foreign currency liabilities (3) 149 172 202
Total external debt 170 171 194
   Of which: short-term 44 48 73
   Of which: corporate 68 70 82
(2) The estimates are based on corporate foreign currency deposits in domestic banks.
(3) Sum of corporate external debt and domestic foreign currency loans.
Source: Prasad, et al. (2005)
(1) Sum of net foreign assets (net claims against foreign residents) and net foreign currency-denominated assets against domestic 
residents.
(USD billions)
 
 
3.3 Regulation and supervision 
The liberalization and restructuring measures have been accompanied by improvements 
in regulation. In 1995, together with the assignment to the PBC of its main objectives, capital 
adequacy requirements were introduced in all commercial banks, as well as prudential ratios, 
namely loan to deposit ones and assets to liquid liabilities. These prudential ratios, however, 
were a formality. In 2002, the PBC, still the Chinese regulator until 2003, established 
the international five-tier loan classification although it was not made fully compulsory. The 
reasons for this weak situation were the PBC’s lack of sanctioning power and 
the decentralized nature of its regulatory and supervisory functions. In fact, the bulk of the 
work was conducted by the local offices, which themselves had to report to the local 
government. 
 
With the establishment of the CBRC in 2003, there were several improvements. First, 
the five-tier loan classification system was enhanced and made fully compulsory for all banks 
by end-2005. Second, capital adequacy became key: after an evaluation of the compliance 
with the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, the 8% minimum capital 
adequacy ratio, defined in Basel I terms, was introduced and a 4% minimum total capital. 
These ratios will need to be fully complied with by 2007. Third, risk-based supervision started 
to be implemented through a new CAMEL-type Risk Assessment System, which not only 
uses quantitative criteria but also qualitative ones for capital, asset quality, management 
competence, liquidity and profitability. For the time being this system is being applied only to 
JSCBs. Fourth, related-party lending has also been limited, which is quite important given the 
concentration of lending in the corporate sector and, in many cases, large SOEs. Fifth, 
enforcement has also improved –although to a much lesser extent– since the CBRC has 
started to impose sanctions for infractions of rules. The latter has been facilitated by the legal 
protection granted to supervisors. Finally, the CBRC has embarked in a large scope program 
of capacity building, necessary to conduct on-site and off-site inspections. 
 
Efforts have also been made to improve bank corporate governance, through the 
creation of shareholder boards with outside directors but this is only a very small step, as shall 
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be explained later. Finally, there is now some disclosure of information, particularly for listed 
banks, which must go through an auditing process as well as the publication of more 
comprehensive balance sheets and income statements. The CBRC, itself, is enhancing its 
transparency through the publication of individual bank data, including NPLs. 
 
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 25 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 0502 
4 An assessment of the banking reform so far and potential impact 
From the information above, there is no doubt about the commitment of the Chinese 
authorities to bank reform and the measures taken seem to go in the right direction. However, 
these measures do not seem to be comprehensive enough and several important ones are 
missing, particularly as regards the incentive structure. The results in terms of bank 
performance are relatively good in some aspects, such as asset quality for the restructured 
SOCBs, but not in others, as we shall explain. 
4.1 Bank restructuring 
So far, the restructuring process has managed to improve asset quality but the results seem 
to be weaker in terms of capitalization. The solvency ratio, calculated according to Basel I, 
was only 6.73%12 in 2003 and the ratio of equity to assets remained at similar levels than 
before the reform started (namely 4.3% in 2003). The capital injections carried out by the 
government in 1998 (33 mm USD) had an immediate positive impact on the ratio equity to 
assets of the banking system (from 4.54% in 1997 to 6.03% in 1998) but this ratio fell again 
even below the 1997 levels. This is because, in the second restructuring wave, most of the 
capital injection was directed to improving asset quality and the third wave has involved 
relatively few funds. In addition, there has been very little private or public capital raised 
otherwise. In 2004, however, the situation has improved for the restructured SOCBs (data is 
not available yet for the whole banking system). 
 
CCB and BoC have received enough public funds to maintain adequate solvency 
levels; measured in Basel I terms (see Chart 10 below). Instead, ICB and, much more so, 
ABC still suffer from much poorer solvency, higher NPLs and very low provisioning ratios, 
both in ratios and levels. We have estimated the capitalization needs of these two SOCBs, so 
as to reach the solvency and asset quality targeted by the Chinese authorities for 2005. 
These amount to 150 billion USD (or the equivalent of 9.7% of 2004 GDP), if we assume the 
same recovery rate for the NPLs as that obtained by AMCs for the other two restructured 
SOCBs (for details see Table A-12 and A-13 in Appendix 1).13 Another point to take into 
account is that the capital injected into SOCBs in the second and third wave is in USD, which 
implies an exchange rate risk, particularly considering the larger probability of a of a RMB 
appreciation. In fact the recent 2.1% revaluation led to a loss of 9.8 billion RMB. 
 
                                                                          
12. Due to data limitations, this ratio has been calculated for the four SOCBs, except for Agricultural Bank of China, and 
ten of the twelve JSCBs. 
13. This is within the estimates provided by Standard & Poors of 110 to 190 billion USD. 
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Chart 10 
99,36
(a) BoC and CCB figures as of June 2004; (b) ABC figures as of end-2003; (c) ICBC figures as of end-2003.
Source: Bankscope, CBRC and Fitch.
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As for asset quality, the three waves of restructuring have reduced NPLs in three of 
the four SOCBs (see Table 1 and A-7 in Appendix 1). This welcome development, though, 
needs to be seen in the context of a very rapid loan growth. In fact, apart from the 
government injections, the improvement in asset quality is mainly explained by the increase in 
the denominator (bank loans), as shown in Chart 11, below. 
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Chart 11. Non-Performing Loans on SOCBs 
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The problem is that there are reasons to think that these new loans may end up 
into NPLs. First, the criteria for granting loans have not changed substantially, as banks’ 
ownership structure is virtually the same and the reform of SOEs still has a long way to go. 
Second, the reported NPL ratio for loans extended after 2000 is only 2.5 %, dramatically 
lower than the NPL ratio for older loans. Third, the slow-down of the economy –particularly if 
abrupt– would convert many loans in bad ones. Fourth, the total amount of NPLs in the 
financial system (i.e., counting what has been transferred to the AMCs and not yet recovered) 
has not fallen much since AMCs have disposed of only (half) one third of the NPLs 
transferred. The latter is due to several factors: first, the incentive structure of AMCs, which 
are evaluated in terms of the recovery value and not so much the speed at which assets are 
disposed of or recovered; second, the poor legal framework under which they operate; third, 
the lack of market instruments to dispose of NPLs. An additional concern is that only the best 
assets have been sold, which raises doubts about the recovery capacity of AMCs in the 
medium term and the costs for the Chinese authorities. Finally, the way in which the asset 
disposal has been designed raises concerns for SOCBs profitability and, eventually, even 
solvency. This is because AMCs –which are formally independent institutions– have 
purchased NPLs either at face value or at a 50% while they are obtaining a much lower 
recovery rate. If government support to AMCs were not to materialize, these agencies will find 
it virtually impossible to pay for the principal of the bonds now at SOCBs’ balance sheets. 
Even the payments of the interest coupon –which are anyhow low– are doubtful.14 This 
support, however, should eventually exist, since the whole reform process would be derailed 
otherwise. 
4.2 Liberalization process 
Although government interference has been reduced with the liberalization process, it is still 
very large compared to international standards. The share of SOCBs has fallen and that 
of JSCBs has risen but even the latter are only partially privatized.15 Furthermore, foreign 
participation is still very limited in most JSCBs. 
 
                                                                          
14. Reportedly, not all interests on these AMC bonds have been paid to SOCBs. 
15. According to the CBRC, the largest private share is 80% for the case of China Minsheng. 
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Competition is still weak, particularly among the largest banks. This is due to several 
factors. First price and quantity controls have not been fully lifted and the opening up to 
foreign competition has proceeded very cautiously. Foreign competition is limited to the 
wholesale business and in few areas. The full opening up, following WTO commitments, at 
end-2006 will change the picture only slightly; the country’s huge size will make it difficult for 
banks to compete through Greenfield investment and direct participation in Chinese banks 
remains limited. In fact, the announcement that SOCBs will be listed does not mean that 
foreign investors will be offered control. Second, fast economic growth and, in particular 
the high investment rate, implies that there is an enormous amount of projects which need to 
be financed. Thus, there is room for all banks to make business. Third, the current upper limit 
on the deposit rate limits competition for deposits, particularly those highly sensitive to the 
return obtained. Finally, the excessive liquidity of the banking system inhibits competition so 
even the programmed full liberalization of the deposit rate might not increase competition in 
this setting. 
 
Regarding capital account liberalization, the relatively small percentage of banks’ 
foreign exchange transactions limits, for the time being, the risks related to sharp exchange 
rate swings. However the fast increase in exposure in the last few years clearly hints at 
growing risks as economic openness and capital account liberalization proceed. This is even 
more the case if we consider that hedging instruments are limited; Chinese banks are not 
used to managing foreign exchange risk; and the regulator has still not developed strict 
prudential tools for foreign exchange risk. Furthermore, the fixed exchange regime may be 
understood as an implicit guarantee, inducing moral hazard and thus a further build-up of 
risks, as has happened in other countries. 
4.3 Regulation and supervision 
Efforts have been huge given the starting conditions of Chinese regulatory authorities. 
However, it is not completely clear how China is going to ensure a level playing field to all 
banks. For example, there are questions as to how the regulation imposing a minimum 
capital adequacy ratio of 8% for all commercial banks will be enforced by end-2007, 
as programmed. We cannot expect ABC, credit cooperatives and even some JSCBs to 
comply with it by that data unless they receive very large capital injections. As previously 
mentioned, for the remaining two SOCBs, our estimate is 150 billion USD and that of credit 
cooperatives and city commercial banks could hovers around 12 billion USD (around 9 billion 
for the former and 3 for the latter). As for JSCBs, we estimate at least 19 billion USD to reach 
a capital to assets ratio similar to that of BoC and CCB, namely 6% (details on this estimate 
can be found in Table A-12 in Appendix 1). 
  
One of the main objectives of strengthening regulation and supervision was the 
introduction of a more cautious approach towards risk. Although it is difficult to draw 
conclusions from the available evidence, there are two facts which can hardly be reconciled 
with an improvement in risk management. First, loan pricing by SOCBs does not seem to 
have changed, despite the additional space provided by the liberalization of interest rates. 
Most loans are still contracted at, or even below, the PBC’s benchmark rate. Second, bank 
lending has continued to grow rapidly (even if it has decelerated somewhat) and there has not 
been a substantial change in the sector composition: traditional sectors, such as 
infrastructure projects, continue to be an important part of new lending (over 20%, as shown 
in Graph 3 above). New sectors, particularly housing, are growing fast, but they still account 
for a small share of outstanding lending. Moreover, the attempts to improve corporate 
governance have not shown clear results yet. The recently created shareholder boards are 
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still a formality and the practically full state-ownership biases the decisions taken by bank 
managers. Finally, Chinese banks are ill-equipped to adopt Basel II –event the second and 
third pillar as announced by the Chinese authorities– as they are still struggling to adopt 
Basel I. The large share of low-rated corporate bonds in their balance sheets will increase 
their need for additional capital under Basel II. In addition, operational risk will probably be 
large because of poor internal controls. 
4.4 General assessment of bank performance 
In the years in which the reform has been ongoing, overall bank performance has not clearly 
improved. This is also the case of JSCBs considered some kind of laboratory of the reform 
because of their partial private ownership and market orientation, relative to SOCBs. 
  
As already mentioned, the most promising developments come from asset quality 
but credit growth explains a good part of it.16 Another good signal is growing provisioning 
although a large part comes from the government recapitalization programs and is still 
insufficient to cover NPLs (see Chart 12 below). Developments in solvency have been less 
encouraging: the capital to asset ratio for the banking system as a whole has remained 
practically unchanged since the beginning of the reform (see Chart 13 below). JSCBs have 
reduced their capital to asset ratios, which is even more worrisome if we consider hat they 
have relatively little Tier II capital17. The reason behind this worrisome trend is fast asset 
growth (nearly three times faster than the average) without recourse to additional capital. 
 
 
 
Chart 12. Percent change in Loan loss reserve to gross loans by type of institution 
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16. In an empirical exercise with bank panel data, García Herrero, Gavilá and Santabárbara (2005) find that bank size, 
measured in terms of assets, tends to increase the flow and NPLs. For the stock of NPLs, both bank size and bank 
concentration, measured in terms of the Herfindhal index, increases it. 
17. The issuance of subordinated debt has been stepped up in 2004-5. 
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Chart 13. Equity to assets 
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Finally, from already low levels, profitability, measured in terms of ROAE, has 
generally declined. This is also the case for JSCBs (see Graph 14 below). There are some 
welcome reasons to explain the fall in profitability, namely declining inflation and real interest 
rates as well as provisioning, which have been found important determinant or profitability in 
an empirical analysis for Chinese banks [García Herrero, Gavilá and Santabárbara (2005)]. In 
the case of JSCBs, ROAE has fallen, notwithstanding their low capital to asset ratio and their 
relatively low cost to income ratio18, because they have experienced a reduction in interest 
income to achieve a higher market share. Graph A-3 in Appendix 1 show which are the main 
factors behind the declining trend of ROAA. 
 
In sum, the reform on the Chinese banking system has not brought sizeable benefits 
so far except for asset quality and doubts remain about a possible build-up of new NPLs 
given the fast credit growth. This poor assessment is valid not only for SOCBs, but also for 
JSCBs, and for the banking system as a whole. In the case of JSCBs, the poor performance 
might be due to the very limited private control of these banks or, on a more optimistic tone, 
because it is too early to feel the benefits. However, it could also be the case that the steps 
taken have not been bold enough and more aggressive measures are needed to change the 
course of events. 
                                                                          
18. García Herrero, Gavilá and Santabárbara (2005) also find these two factors significant determinants of the Return on 
Assets (ROAA). 
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Chart 14. Return on equity (ROAE) 
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5 Suggestions for future steps 
5.1 An accelerated and more comprehensive reform strategy 
Although the Chinese reform is going in the right direction, we argue that it should be 
accelerated and made more comprehensive. We offer three main reasons for this. First, the 
challenges that the Chinese economy faces are pressing, in terms of huge financing needs for 
such a dynamic economy and the commitment to open-up to foreign competition by 
end-2006. Second, opportunities are also large, since China is considered a very attractive 
economy and foreign investors’ interest is enormous. Third, the reform, so far, has not 
managed to improve banks’ performance to an extent that we can be sure that the process 
will not be derailed. The main risk in this regard is the huge pile-up of new loans, some of 
which could become non-performing in the future, particularly if the economy decelerates. 
 
The main objectives of this comprehensive reform should be: (i) raising asset quality 
and solvency to international levels, as soon as possible, and maintaining them, 
notwithstanding the very fast growth of credit; (ii) transforming existing banks into viable, 
financially sound and independent commercial institutions. The former requires a complete 
restructuring, coupled with improved corporate culture, risk management, supervision and, 
possibly a change in the ownership structure. For the second, apart from better corporate 
governance, completing financial liberalization is needed so that banks learn to take decisions 
of their own and to manage risk. Finally, this second objective should also imply choosing a 
model for the Chinese banking system, in terms of institutional functioning, size, structure and 
ownership. 
5.2 On bank restructuring 
The authorities seem to have embarked in the restructuring process without a clear 
diagnosis of the underlying causes of the problem. Or, if such diagnosis exists, it has not 
been considered with the highest priority. It seems undeniable that government 
interference is behind the huge accumulation of NPLs. Bold and fast steps are needed to 
improve corporate governance and to reduce government control in the banking system. 
Good corporate governance requires strong in-house capability to price and monitor credit 
risk, which is a challenge given the scarcity of human capital in Chinese banks. Assessing 
interest and exchange risk will become more relevant as financial liberalization moves on. 
The introduction of internal audit and external audits needs to be accelerated and 
strengthened. 
  
As for the cleaning up of NPLs and the recapitalization of the banking system, the 
current strategy is too piecemeal and is not time-bound. Chinese authorities should announce 
a precise timetable with specific deadlines for NPL disposal and recapitalization up to Basel I 
solvency levels for those banks deemed viable. The sooner the financial system is freed from 
NPLs, the easier it will be to introduce good corporate governance and risk management. The 
two, however, should go hand in hand, to avoid using the newly injected capital to grant loans 
under the same criteria as before. In this regard, the currently very high interest of foreign 
investors in China should be profited from since a larger share of foreign competition in 
the Chinese banking system would be of great benefit to change the incentive structure. 
The example of Central and Eastern Europe is interesting in this regard since foreign banks 
were a key restructuring instrument.  
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Independently from a change in ownership structure, the Chinese authorities should 
take action to solve both the stock and the flow problem. Removing inherited NPLs is 
important but even more so freeing banks from inherited bad clients; by nature, banking is a 
relational business and bad relations are hard to break. A key measure to tackle the flow 
problem is accelerating SOEs’ restructuring. Otherwise, the tight links between SOCBs and 
SOEs are bound to bring new NPLs. In this regard, the government announcement that SOEs 
will not be bailed out from 2008 onwards is welcome. Besides, financial liberalization will 
oblige banks to evaluate risk and price it properly, instead of taking the official lending rate as 
given. In this regard, risk management procedures, still at their infancy in China, need to be 
improved as fast as possible. This obviously requires capacity building at banks, which 
can be speeded up through the participation of foreign investors in banks’ ownership. 
A new bankruptcy law –whose approval has been delayed in several instances–, is also 
needed, to help restore debt-payment capacity among viable firms and recover NPLs from 
banks and AMCs. 
 
As for the stock problem, the Chinese model, based on one AMC per SOCBs, is 
probably delaying the resolution of the NPL problem. In fact, in the absence of a monopolistic 
position, AMCs are obliged to compete offering high recovery values. The fact that their 
position with large borrowers is not strong probably delays recovery too. Another problem is 
that the governmental nature of AMCs is not explicit so that they should, at least formally, 
care for profitability, probably delaying disposal. For the latter, an explicit government 
guarantee to AMCs would be highly welcome. Finally, fiscal cost considerations should not 
delay the process: the longer it takes to solve the problem the higher the cost will be. Finally, 
the transfer of NPLs to solve the stock problem, should be accompanied by enough capital 
injections to comply with the capital adequacy ratio. This is not only necessary for the 
soundness of Chinese banks but also to improve its profitability [as shown by García-Herrero, 
Gavilá and Santabárbara (2005) for the ROAA)]. The current approach based on different 
restructuring waves, and starting with capital injections, does not induce bank managers to 
strengthen the assessment of risks when granting credit. The easiest way to improve this 
situation is to link recapitalization to a change in ownership (i.e., privatization). Another –more 
difficult– possibility to set stringent rules for provisioning and improving asset quality while 
forcing a change in corporate governance. Finally, the substitution of NPLs with bonds issued 
by AMC appears as a good restructuring technique as long as AMCs are solvent or have a 
clear government guarantee. Otherwise, banks may be facing new problems when these 
bonds are due, or even before if AMCs cannot recover enough assets to pay for the annual 
interests of these bonds. 
 
Regarding privatization, only solvent and viable institutions should be privatized. 
Otherwise, there is a risk that these banks can never be profitable and that shareholder 
problems are bounced back to the public sector. Not all privatization methods are equally 
effective in improving corporate governance. While initial public offerings (IPOs) may be 
politically attractive, widely held ownership is unlikely to produce the desired improvements in 
operations, management, and controls that a strategic investment by a strong financial 
institution would deliver. Options to ensure participation by a desirable strategic investor 
include a sale by tender or an IPO, where a significant percentage is reserved for a 
pre-qualified investor. The Chinese authorities seem to have followed this path with CCB, 
which is welcome but more might be needed in the most difficult cases. This would imply the 
transfer of the control from the state to the acquirer. 
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For the Chinese case, it is important to note that controlling interest does not 
necessarily imply majority ownership. The voting rights on the investors’ shares, versus those 
retained by the government, can be structured in such a way as to convey controlling 
influence to a minority stakeholder, or explicit agreements can be made as part of the 
contract that the investor will make appointments to key management and board positions. 
Finally, even if the State retains control of banks, the same level playing field needs to be 
ensured between private (also foreign) and public banks. This will be tackled later in the 
suggestions for improved regulation and supervision. 
5.3 On financial liberalization 
China has taken a very cautious approach to liberalization but it faces pressures to accelerate 
it from several fronts. First, the international community is calling for exchange rate flexibility, 
which eventually needs to be accompanied by capital account liberalization19. This might 
bring new opportunities, but also new risks, for the financial system. The major risk that 
Chinese authorities perceive is capital flight, which would imply a sharp drop in the deposits 
held at Chinese commercial banks. Second, China has committed under the WTO to finalize 
the opening up of the banking system to foreign competition by 2006. Although this basically 
refers to Greenfield investment (which may take long to acquire a large dimension in China’s 
huge market), it is still an important challenge for Chinese relatively inefficient banks. 
 
As for the sequencing of liberalization, China has basically gone by the handbook, 
starting with macroeconomic stabilization, followed by domestic financial liberalization and 
leaving capital account liberalization as last step [McKinnon (1982)]. However, in China’s case 
the completion of bank restructuring is needed to profit fully from financial liberalization. We 
see two reasons for this. First, banks will probably not use correctly the room offered by 
financial liberalization unless banks’ incentive structure changes. In fact, banks are not using 
the space they now have to increase the lending rate. In addition, the currently “guaranteed” 
minimum interest rate spread –because of the floor on the lending rate and the ceiling on the 
deposit rate– contributes to a rather large interest rate margin which could be reduced with 
full interest rate liberalization, particularly if competition increases. The potential additional fall 
in profitability would call for an increase in the currently very low capitalization of the Chinese 
banking system since so as to counteract this trend.20 
 
As for the opening-up, there is not doubt that foreign capital can help modernize the 
Chinese banking system, through better corporate governance and risk management, in 
addition to fresh capital. To achieve this goal, however, their presence cannot be limited to 
representative offices or branches focused on niche businesses. They should become a real 
competitive force in the intermediation of domestic savings. Given the country’s huge size, 
this can only be achieved, in a reasonably short time, by allowing foreign banks to obtain the 
control of some Chinese financial institutions, as previously proposed. 
 
Finally, a successful opening of the capital account requires a change in the way 
monetary and exchange rate policies are conducted. Monetary instruments that impose a 
high cost or administrative constraint on the banks –as is the case with credit or interest rate 
ceilings or high non-remunerated reserve requirements– need to be substituted by market 
instruments. 
                                                                          
19. Prasad, et al. (2005) argue that exchange rate flexibilization may come first but they acknowledge that it will need to 
be followed by capital account liberalization. 
20. As previously mentioned, García Herrero, Gavilá and Santabarbara (2005) find the equity to asset ratio to be a key 
determinant of ROAA. 
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5.4 On regulation and supervision 
Although the authorities have moved forward on this front, bolder steps are needed. The 
main objectives should be: (i) to improve –or at least maintain– asset quality but also solvency; 
and (ii) to ensure a level playing field across different institutions. 
  
For the former, the current regulation on asset quality and solvency should be 
enforced to all commercial banks and sanctions applied when necessary. The recent major 
scandals in some SOCBs are a sign of the need for coercion and sanctioning power, so that 
the experience will not be repeated. In addition, the regulator should encourage a radical 
change in the banks’ incentive structure, though better corporate governance and reducing 
government intervention. This is clearly key since, in the current setting, regulators and 
owners are generally the same. Apart from a change in the ownership structure, the regulator 
has a role to play by requesting to strengthen the functions of the board of independent 
directors so that they are clearly charged with fiduciary responsibility for the public funds 
invested in the bank. Finally, better bank management techniques need to be encouraged as 
well as a tighter grip on risk management. This should include exchange rate risk, given the 
country’s move towards more exchange rate flexibility and the gradual lifting of foreign 
exchange controls. 
 
To ensure a level-playing field, banks should have a clear mandate as to what are 
their duties when operating on a commercial basis. This should include full insulation from 
political influence and be subject to the same regulatory and supervisory regime. Such 
mandate should not only include SOCBs but, possibly, credit cooperatives. Policy banks, as 
development banks, should also have clear rules they should abide with. In addition, 
Accounting rules in line with international standards are crucial to ensure a level playing field 
as well as external and internal auditing. Finally, more disclosure, starting with the regular 
publication of banks balance sheets and income statements. 
 
Other steps towards improving the institutional setting of the banking system need to 
be taken swiftly, such as a better functioning of the payment system, the creation of a credit 
register and a limited an explicit deposit insurance system. The recent announcement of a 
government compensation for individual deposits is welcome but it could be defined better. 
Finally, a bankruptcy law, which also deals with financial institutions, needs to be established 
as soon as possible. 
 
All in all, it seems clear that the announcement of a comprehensive, fast and 
time-bound reform strategy is urgently needed, where the authorities should clarify their long 
term view of the Chinese financial sector and the steps they will take to achieve it, with 
precise deadlines. For the reform to be comprehensive, a clear definition of responsibilities for 
each Chinese agency involved would be highly welcome, as well as the nomination of a single 
coordinator. As for the speed, the current reform process seems too slow for the immediate 
challenges that China faces so that it risks being derailed. The strategy should not be that of 
“growing out of the problem”, as could be interpreted from the rapid growth in bank lending. 
Finally, foreign players should be offered an important role in the process since government 
intervention is at the origin of the problem and there are not enough private investors in the 
country having banking experience. 
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ACRONYMS 
ABC Agricultural Bank of China 
AMCs Asset management companies 
BoC Bank of China 
CBRC China Banking and Regulatory Commission 
CCB China Construction Bank 
CCBs City Commercial Banks 
ICB Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
ITICs International Trust and Investment Corporation 
JSCBs Joint-Stock Commercial Banks 
NPLs Non-performing Loans 
PBC People's Bank of China 
PPP Purchasing Power Parity 
RMB Renminbi 
ROAA Return on Average Assets  
ROAE Return on Average Equity 
SAFE State Administration of Foreign Exchange  
SMEs Small and Medium Size Enterprises 
SOCBs State-owned Commercial Banks 
SOEs State-owned Enterprises 
USD United States Dollar 
WTO World Trade Organization 
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Appendix 1: Graphs and Tables 
Graph A-1. International comparison of bank credit to the private sector, as a 
percentage of GDP 
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Graph A-2. International comparison of bank credit to the private sector, in USD 
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Table A – 1. Share on assets by type of institution 
SOCBs JSCBs
Credit 
Cooperatives
CCBs
Foreign 
Funded Banks
Policy Banks
Other 
Institutions
Total Assets 
(USD billion)
1993 73.9 4.4 11.4 0.0 0.0 9.9 0.4 695
1994 72.1 5.4 12.9 0.0 0.0 9.2 0.5 596
1995 69.7 6.6 14.3 0.0 0.0 8.8 0.7 770
1996 65.3 7.3 14.1 0.0 0.0 12.4 0.9 944
1997 65.8 7.1 14.2 0.0 0.0 12.0 0.9 1,154
1998 65.1 7.5 13.5 0.0 0.0 13.0 1.0 1,333
1999 64.9 8.1 13.3 0.0 0.0 12.8 1.0 1,489
2000 63.9 9.6 13.1 0.0 0.0 12.3 1.0 1,680
2001 60.5 11.3 14.1 0.0 0.0 12.8 1.3 1,797
2002 57.9 12.8 9.9 4.9 1.2 11.4 1.7 2,598
2003 56.1 14.0 10.1 5.3 1.2 11.5 1.8 3,070
2004 54.6 15.0 10.4 5.4 1.6 11.4 1.5 3,619
Source: CEIC  
 
 
Table A – 2. Asset Structure of the Banking Sector 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Loans 62,7 62,3 59,9 57,6 57,3 58,8 60,8
State-owned commercial banks 60,7 61,1 57,6 55,9 56,8 57,9 60,3
Other Commercial banks 48,8 48,2 47,0 47,6 53,0 55,0 58,5
Joint Stock Commercial Banks 48,4 50,5 49,9 50,3 53,7 57,0 60,5
Other 49,5 44,6 41,5 42,0 49,5 47,5 50,5
Policy banks 93,2 89,7 92,2 89,2 81,7 93,5 92,1
EU-15 49,2 49,4 48,3 47,9 47,0 46,7 45,2
Other risky assets 1) 11,1 14,7 18,1 22,1 24,6 24,7 23,7
State-owned commercial banks 11,4 15,2 20,3 24,3 25,2 25,9 24,9
Other Commercial banks 12,9 16,3 17,7 19,6 23,8 25,0 22,8
Joint Stock Commercial Banks 15,9 19,2 19,1 20,9 21,9 22,1 20,6
Other 8,0 11,7 15,0 17,0 32,7 36,5 31,6
Policy banks 3,0 6,8 4,9 8,5 16,6 1,7 1,3
EU-15 17,5 18,3 21,2 22,4 23,4 24,1 24,8
Liquid assets 24,2 21,1 20,0 18,3 16,0 14,6 13,7
State-owned commercial banks 25,7 21,6 19,9 17,7 15,9 14,2 13,1
Other Commercial banks 37,1 34,3 33,8 31,3 21,6 18,5 17,4
Joint Stock Commercial Banks 34,4 29,0 29,3 27,3 22,8 19,6 17,6
Other 41,6 42,7 42,4 39,9 15,9 14,5 16,5
Policy banks 3,6 3,2 2,6 1,8 1,5 3,8 5,4
EU-15 32,1 31,1 29,4 28,7 28,6 28,2 29,0
Fixed Assets 1,9 1,8 2,0 2,0 2,0 1,9 1,7
State-owned commercial banks 2,2 2,0 2,1 2,1 2,1 2,0 1,7
Other Commercial banks 1,1 1,2 1,5 1,4 1,6 1,4 1,3
Joint Stock Commercial Banks 1,2 1,3 1,7 1,6 1,5 1,4 1,3
Other 1,0 1,0 1,1 1,2 1,9 1,4 1,4
Policy banks 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,5 0,3 1,0 1,2
EU-15 1,2 1,2 1,1 1,1 1,0 1,0 0,9
Source: Bankscope
1) It includes AMC bonds.
(as a percentage of total assets)
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Table A – 3. Liability Structure of the Banking Sector 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Deposits & Short term funding 83,6 82,3 81,0 83,7 83,8 89,0 89,1
State-owned Commercial Banks 89,1 88,8 89,4 90,3 90,9 91,8 92,1
Other Commercial Banks 85,6 86,3 78,0 79,2 80,9 81,8 81,7
Joint Stock Commercial Banks 84,6 86,1 73,7 75,6 79,0 79,7 79,9
Other 87,4 86,6 86,0 86,8 89,7 89,9 88,7
Policy Banks 64,8 50,4 47,9 45,3 5,1 82,6 83,7
EU-15 73,0 73,0 70,9 69,3 69,2 69,5 68,2
Other Funding 5,7 6,3 6,9 5,3 5,7 1,1 1,1
State-owned Commercial Banks 1,2 0,8 0,7 0,6 0,6 0,4 0,4
Other Commercial Banks 1,0 0,3 0,7 0,5 0,7 0,4 0,6
Joint Stock Commercial Banks 1,6 0,5 1,1 0,6 0,6 0,3 0,5
Other 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,2 1,0 0,9 1,2
Policy Banks 27,2 38,3 43,1 46,7 84,8 11,7 12,2
EU-15 13,1 12,3 13,0 13,2 13,4 12,2 13,0
Other (Non-Interest bearing) 6,1 5,4 6,4 5,4 5,4 5,4 5,5
State-owned Commercial Banks 6,5 4,8 4,6 3,8 3,5 3,2 3,1
Other Commercial Banks 6,1 6,4 14,7 14,3 14,2 14,0 13,9
Joint Stock Commercial Banks 8,1 8,1 20,2 19,2 16,5 16,4 16,1
Other 2,9 3,7 4,2 3,9 3,5 4,5 5,5
Policy Banks 3,4 6,6 4,4 3,2 4,1 2,9 1,1
EU-15 9,4 10,0 10,4 11,4 11,4 12,1 12,6
Equity 4,5 6,0 5,7 5,6 5,2 4,5 4,3
State-owned Commercial Banks 3,2 5,6 5,3 5,3 5,0 4,6 4,4
Other Commercial Banks 7,2 7,0 6,6 6,0 4,2 3,8 3,8
Joint Stock Commercial Banks 5,7 5,4 4,9 4,5 3,9 3,6 3,5
Other 9,7 9,6 9,7 9,1 5,9 4,8 4,6
Policy Banks 4,6 4,7 4,6 4,7 6,0 2,8 3,0
EU-15 4,2 4,4 4,4 4,6 4,5 4,6 4,5
Source: Bankscope
(as a percentage of total assets)
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Table A – 4. Sources and uses of bank financing 
Deposits  
(USD billion) Enterprise
Fiscal 
Deposits Govt. Agency
Household 
Saving 
Deposits
Rural 
Deposits
Trust 
Deposits Other
1993 518 29 2 2 51 4 0 12
1994 466 33 2 2 53 3 0 7
1995 649 32 2 2 55 2 0 7
1996 823 33 2 1 56 2 0 6
1997 990 35 2 1 56 2 3 1
1998 1156 34 2 1 56 2 3 2
1999 1314 34 2 2 55 2 3 3
2000 1495 36 3 2 52 2 2 3
2001 1735 36 2 2 51 2 2 4
2002 2063 35 2 3 51 2 1 5
2003 2511 35 2 3 50 2 1 6
2004 2905 35 3 3 50 2 1 6
Total Loans 
(USD billion)
Short Term 
(ST) ST: Industrial
ST: 
Commercial
ST: 
Construction
ST: 
Agricultural
Medium to 
Long Term Other
1993 576 74 22 28 3 15 16 11
1994 470 67 21 25 3 11 20 13
1995 609 59 20 25 2 6 20 21
1996 734 66 20 24 3 12 20 14
1997 900 74 22 25 2 4 21 2
1998 1045 70 21 23 2 5 24 3
1999 1132 68 19 21 2 5 26 4
2000 1200 66 17 18 2 5 28 3
2001 1357 60 17 17 2 5 35 3
2002 1584 57 15 14 2 5 37 5
2003 1919 53 14 11 2 5 41 6
2004 2142 49 13 10 2 6 43 7
Source: CEIC
Source of deposits (percentage)
Use of loans (percentage)
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Table A – 5. Selected Indicators for the performance 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Return on average assets (ROAA) (%) 0.43 0.22 0.20 0.26 0.23 0.22 0.14
State-owned commercial banks 0.19 0.09 0.13 0.22 0.16 0.18 0.08
Other Commercial banks 1.05 0.75 0.49 0.41 0.41 0.37 0.32
Joint Stock Commercial Banks 0.78 0.58 0.45 0.40 0.39 0.34 0.29
Other 1.50 1.03 0.57 0.43 0.46 0.51 0.47
Policy banks -0.12 0.07 0.06 0.14 0.26 0.01 0.03
Return on average equity (ROAE) (%) 9.39 4.19 3.48 4.59 4.21 4.48 3.05
State-owned commercial banks 5.94 2.08 2.35 4.07 3.16 3.78 1.73
Other Commercial banks 14.61 10.55 7.22 6.49 8.10 9.33 8.56
Joint Stock Commercial Banks 13.76 10.47 8.69 8.42 9.50 9.17 8.07
Other 15.42 10.62 5.86 4.54 5.86 9.81 10.00
Policy banks -2.68 1.40 1.21 2.97 4.99 0.23 1.00
Net interest margin (%) 2.03 2.07 1.90 2.22 1.93 1.95 2.03
State-owned commercial banks 2.40 2.47 2.07 2.35 1.98 2.02 2.11
Other Commercial banks 2.49 2.50 2.25 2.24 2.10 2.18 2.19
Joint Stock Commercial Banks 2.38 2.57 2.20 2.30 2.32 2.21 2.27
Other 2.68 2.40 2.32 2.14 1.43 2.04 1.89
Policy banks -0.06 0.02 0.81 1.63 1.47 1.01 1.21
Cost to Income Ratio (%) 54.51 65.40 62.22 56.61 54.51 55.52 51.68
State-owned commercial banks 49.31 66.33 59.16 56.18 55.52 51.76 47.87
Other Commercial banks 49.56 59.96 64.07 59.80 51.17 50.92 45.67
Joint Stock Commercial Banks 56.05 63.13 55.33 52.24 50.48 50.64 44.71
Other 38.61 54.47 77.17 75.20 54.47 52.04 49.52
Policy banks 65.94 34.25 48.49 23.47 6.23 64.93 67.22
Equity / Total Assets (%) 4.54 6.03 5.72 5.56 5.16 4.54 4.34
State-owned commercial banks 3.15 5.61 5.28 5.32 5.04 4.59 4.38
Other Commercial banks 7.20 7.01 6.60 5.99 4.22 3.81 3.76
Joint Stock Commercial Banks 5.68 5.36 4.95 4.53 3.86 3.56 3.55
Other 9.72 9.63 9.70 9.07 5.91 4.78 4.57
Policy banks 4.60 4.73 4.59 4.72 5.98 2.81 2.95
Capital Funds / Liabilities (%) 4.76 6.41 6.07 5.89 5.44 4.76 4.55
State-owned commercial banks 3.26 5.94 5.57 5.62 5.31 4.81 4.58
Other Commercial banks 7.76 7.54 7.07 6.37 4.41 3.96 3.97
Joint Stock Commercial Banks 6.02 5.66 5.20 4.75 4.01 3.69 3.77
Other 10.76 10.66 10.75 9.97 6.28 5.02 4.79
Policy banks 4.82 4.97 4.81 4.96 6.36 2.90 3.04
Loan Loss Reserve / Gross Loans (%) 1.03 1.26 1.55 1.46 1.81 1.81 3.30
State-owned commercial banks 1.00 1.12 1.52 1.24 1.66 1.82 3.91
Other Commercial banks 1.83 2.43 2.99 3.82 2.93 2.32 2.08
Joint Stock Commercial Banks 1.05 1.63 2.23 3.94 3.35 2.60 2.24
Other 3.06 3.84 4.69 3.52 0.80 1.01 1.32
Policy banks 0.73 1.06 0.79 0.73 1.64 1.02 1.01
Loan Loss Provisions (USD millions) 2,197 2,957 3,662 6,971 10,277 10,379 14,061
State-owned commercial banks 2,109 2,409 3,203 5,565 7,989 8,798 11,025
Other Commercial banks 74 113 371 756 1,008 1,582 3,036
Joint Stock Commercial Banks 74 113 355 715 906 1,229 2,603
Other 0 0 15 41 102 353 433
Policy banks 0 436 89 650 1,281 0 0
Source: Bankscope  
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 44 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 0502 
Table A – 6. Income and Expenditure Structure of the Banking Sector 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Interest income 90.2 91.2 90.4 91.9 90.7 87.0 87.0
State-owned commercial banks 96.4 96.7 95.1 95.3 93.9 91.3 91.2
Other Commercial banks 85.4 89.4 88.8 90.6 91.6 93.0 93.0
Joint Stock Commercial Banks 81.9 86.8 89.0 90.4 91.7 94.5 94.7
Other 90.1 92.4 88.4 90.8 90.9 87.6 87.1
Policy banks 88.2 85.8 95.4 98.4 97.7 97.5 97.5
Commission Income 2.4 2.5 4.2 4.2 4.3 5.0 5.2
State-owned commercial banks 2.5 2.8 3.6 4.2 4.7 5.8 6.1
Other Commercial banks 4.5 3.6 3.9 4.2 3.7 3.9 4.1
Joint Stock Commercial Banks 2.5 1.9 2.5 3.1 4.1 4.3 4.5
Other 7.2 5.5 5.7 5.7 2.4 2.5 2.6
Policy banks 0.3 0.7 4.5 1.3 1.7 2.4 2.4
Other Income 7.4 6.3 5.4 3.9 5.1 8.0 7.8
State-owned commercial banks 1.1 0.5 1.3 0.6 1.4 2.9 2.7
Other Commercial banks 10.2 6.9 7.3 5.2 4.7 3.1 2.9
Joint Stock Commercial Banks 15.7 11.2 8.4 6.4 4.2 1.3 0.8
Other 2.6 2.1 5.9 3.5 6.8 9.9 10.3
Policy banks 11.5 13.4 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.0 0.1
Interest Expenditure 75.9 70.8 65.7 63.4 54.3 45.4 42.0
State-owned commercial banks 76.4 68.6 64.9 64.4 54.5 46.0 41.9
Other Commercial banks 70.7 68.5 61.8 59.4 54.3 48.5 47.5
Joint Stock Commercial Banks 64.4 59.2 59.8 55.0 53.3 47.8 45.3
Other 79.8 78.8 64.0 65.3 58.6 51.2 55.3
Policy banks 92.2 91.2 89.3 81.1 70.0 78.2 73.9
Personnel Expenditure 0.9 1.1 1.7 3.0 4.1 8.2 8.6
State-owned commercial banks 1.5 1.6 2.5 3.9 4.8 10.4 11.1
Other Commercial banks 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.9 3.8 4.0 4.6
Joint Stock Commercial Banks 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.6 4.7 5.2 5.9
Other - - - - - - -
Policy banks - - - - - - -
Other Expenditure (1) 23.2 28.2 32.6 33.6 41.5 46.3 49.4
State-owned commercial banks 22.1 29.8 32.6 31.7 40.6 43.6 46.9
Other Commercial banks 29.1 31.3 37.5 39.7 41.9 47.4 47.9
Joint Stock Commercial Banks 35.4 40.4 39.4 43.4 42.0 47.1 48.8
Other 20.2 21.2 36.0 34.7 41.4 48.8 44.7
Policy banks 7.8 8.8 10.6 18.7 29.7 21.8 26.1
(1) Include personnel expenditures if it is not reported before.
Source: Bankscope
 (as a percentage of total income and expenditure respectively)
 
 
 
Table A – 7. NPL ratio in each SOCB 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Agricultural Bank of China - 42,1 36,6 30,8 26,8
Bank of China 26,5 26,7 23,6 16,3 5,5
China Construction Bank 19,9 19,0 15,1 8,3 3,1
Industrial & Commercial Bank of China 34,4 29,8 25,7 21,5 19,5
Source: Bankscope
(based on the Five-Category Classification)
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Table A – 8. Interest rate liberalization process 
1990 Pilot liberalization of inter-bank lending market and rates
1996 Creation of unified inter-bank market
1996 Abolish the upper limit of interbank lending rates
1996 Market based issuance of government bonds on pilot markets (stock markets)
1997 Utilization of the inter-bank market to deal in inter-bank bond repo transactions.
Liberalization of the bond repo interest rates
1998 Market-based issuance of financial bonds by the policy banks
1999 Market-based issuance of government bonds
3.1. Foreign currency rates
3. 1. 1. Loans
1996 Introduction of foreign currency business in the commercial banks
2000 Liberalization of lending rates
3. 1. 2. Deposits
2000 Liberalization of over 3m USD deposit rates
2002 Liberalization of small deposit rates of residents in foreign financial institutions
2003 Liberalization of deposit rates in GBP, FRF, CHF, CAD.
2003 Lower limit of deposit rates removed
2004 Liberalization of small deposits rates with maturity above one year.
3. 2. RMB rates
3. 2. 1. Loans
1987 Surcharge until 20% on reference rates on loans (working capital) 
1996 The band changes to +-10% around reference rates
1998 Increase of upper limit to 20% (RCCs 50%)
1999 Increase of upper limit to 30% (RCCs and large enterprises 10%)
2003 Increase of upper limit to pilot RCCs to 100%
2004 Increase of upper limit to 70% and to RCCs to 100%. Lower limit remain at 90%
2004 Liberalization of upper limit of RMB lending rates (excluding UCCs and RCCs, that 
increase until 130% above reference rates)
3. 2. 2. Deposits
1999 Negotiation on rates on over 30m RMB deposits with maturity above 5 years for 
insurance companies
2002 Same scheme for Social Security Fund
2003 Same scheme for China Postal Saving and Remittance Bureau
2004 All kind deposit rates can adjust downward
Source: PBC (2005)
1. Liberalization of inter-bank lending rates
2. Liberalization of bond market interest rates
3. Market-based reform of lending and deposit rates
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Table A – 9. Foreign bank acquisitions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chinese bank Assets in 2003 
(million of USD) 
Share on 
assets in 2003 
(% of bank 
system assets) 
Foreign bank Date of the 
agreement 
(or 
publication)
Stake 
acquired (%)
Observations
China Everbright Bank 47.63 1.4 Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) 
oct-96 3.0
Nanjing Commercial Bank 3.6 0.1 International Finance 
Corporation (IFC)
nov-01 15.0
Bank of Shangai 23.4 0.7 Hong Kong and Shanghai 
Banking Corp (HSBC)
dic-01 8.0 Acquisition of 8%. HSBC, IFC and 
other foreign investors maintain a 
share of 18%
Shangai Pudong 
Development Bank
44.8 1.3 Citigroup ago-02 4.6 Increase its share to 5% in 
November 2003
Xi'an Commercial Bank 3.1 0.1 IFC and Royal Bank of 
Canada (RBC)
sep-02 24.9 IFC acquires 12,5% and RBC buy a 
12,4% stake. First operation in the 
north-east part of China
Nanchong Commercial 
Bank
1.5 0.4 DEG, una filial de KFW ene-03 n.a. First acquisition in the south east of 
China
Qingdao International Bank 0.0 0.0 Hana Bank oct-03 50.0 Acquisition of 50% stake in 
exchange of 16,1 millions of USD. 
Foreign bank as the major 
shareholder
China Minsheng Banking 
Corporation
43.6 1.3 IFC nov-03 1.6
Fujian Industrial Bank Co. 
Ltd
1.5 0.0 Hang Seng Bank, IFC, The 
Government of Singapore 
Investment Corporation
dic-03 25.0
Ping An Bank 0.1 n.a. HSBC, Ping An of China mar-04 n.a. HSBC y Ping An bought Fujian Asian 
Bank and founded Ping An Bank. It 
is planned to convert it into a Urban 
Commercial Bank by 2007
Shenzen Development 
Bank
22.9 0.7 Newbridge Asia AIV III, LP may-04 18.0
Bank of Communications 114.8 3.4 HSBC ago-04 20.0 Strategic investor. HSBC will pay 1.7 
billions of USD for a stake of 20%
Industrial Bank 31.4 0.9 Hang Seng Bank (HSBC), 
Government of Singapore 
and IFC
mar-04 25.0 Hang Seng Bank acquires 15,98%, 
Government of Singapore 5% 
through Tetrad Investment Pte Ltd. 
and IFC 4%.
Jinan City Commercial 
Bank
2.4 0.1 Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia
nov-04 11.0
Bohai Bank n.a. n.a. Standard Chartered nov-04 20.0
China Construction Bank 429.3 13.4 Bank of America jun-05 9.0 Acquisition of 9% for USD 2.5 
billions. The new owner will get a 
seat on the CCB board.
n.a.: not available
Source: own calculations from Financial Times, Bankscope, He & Fan (2004) and CBRC.
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Table A – 10. Current situation on Financial Openness 
Area Type Description
Inflows No restrictions for non-residents (and also for profits' repatriation and investment 
liquidation) beyond the regional and sectoral limits
Outflows Requires the authorization of the SAFE, except some kind projects pre-
authorized by the State Council
Inflows Non-residents only can only purchase B shares (nominated in RMB) but the QFII 
can buy A shares (for residents) with limitations
Outflows Only authorized resident financial institutions by the SAFE can purchase shares 
abroad.
Issuance abroad or in foreign currency requires an administrative approbation.
Inflows Not allowed, neither purchases or issuances
Outflows Only resident financial institutions authorized by the SAFE can purchase money 
market instruments abroad.
Issuance abroad or in foreign currency requires an administrative approbation.
Inflows In general, only for financial institutions, enterprises authorized and foreign funded 
enterpries can borrow. Nonethelless, financing under 3 moths of maturity is not 
subject to limitations.
Outflows Only financial institution after the analysis of the operation by the SAFE. It is 
allowed, with limitations, the advance repayment of the loans in foreign currency.
Inflows Not allowed or allowed with strong requirements
Outflows Either purchases or issuance are subject to prior approbation
Inflows No restrictions
Outflows Requires the approbation of the SAFE
Deposits operations
Other financial instruments
Direct Investment and real 
state transactions
Stocks and bonds
Money market instruments 
Credit operations
 
 
Table A – 11. Steps in Financial Account Liberalization 
Date Objective Area of reform Description
2004 Limit RMB convertibility Capital inflows Limited convertibility of RMB for foreign banks
FDI can only be conveted to RMB upon proof of 
domestic payment
2004 Portfolio Investment Capital outflows The national Security Fund and domestic insurance 
firms were approved to invest part of this portfolios 
2004 QFII Capital inflows Soften the remaining restrictions
2002 QFII Capital inflows Qualified foreign Institutional investors may invest in 
A shares (for residents, in RMB) with some 
restrictions (maximum of investment, maximum 
share in a single company, size of the investor 
among others)
2001 FDI Capital outflows Pre-authorised investment overseas in strategic 
projects that entail importing materials of China or 
foreign aid projects.
2001 Credit operations Capital outflows Lifting restriction on advance repayments of loans in 
foreign currency
2001 Stock market Capital outflows Domestic investors are allowed to invest in B shares 
(for non-residents) with foreign deposits
1998 Bond market Capital outflows Partial authorization to issue bond in foreign 
currency
1997 Announcement of Financial Account 
liberalization by 2000
Capital inflows 
and outflows  
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Table A – 12. Estimated government cost of recapitalization of ICBC and ABC 
SOCB Actual figures Recapitalization needs1
Industrial & Commercial Bank of China
NPL 86,052 63,453
NPL/LOANS 19,47%
PROVISIONS 12 0,384
PROVISIONS/NPL 13,95%
EQUITY 29,955 10,89
EQUITY/ASSETS 4,40%
Total 74,72
Agricultural Bank of China
NPL 79,812 63,023
NPL/LOANS 26,82%
PROVISIONS 4 4,334
PROVISIONS/NPL 4,80%
EQUITY 16,66 8,27
EQUITY/ASSETS 4,01%
Total 75,62
Author's own calculations
5 It includes the government's capital injection of USD 15 billion in 2005.
1 Recapitalization needs are calculated as the difference between the actual levels of NPLs, provisions and equity, and
the necessary levels to achieve the objective values for the three ratios (NPL/loans, provisions/NPL and equity/assets)
established by the CBRC for BOC and CCB at 2005 (4%, 70% and 6%, respectively).
2 NPLs are obtained from the bank's ratio NPL/loans published by CBRC at 2004 and bank's total loans at end 2003
considering a loans' estimated growth rate of 10% in 2004. 
3 We assume that the AMCs recover the same amount of NPLs as now (7.2% in cash value). In this setting, the amount
recover by AMCs reduces the cost of recapitalization for the Chinese government.
4 We assume that the banks modify their NPLs before their provisions so the necessary level of provisions is calculated
over the objective NPLs. 
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Table A – 13. Estimated recapitalization needs for JSCBs 
JSCB NPL1 PROVISONS2 EQUITY3 TOTAL
Bank of Communications4 5,71 0,47 1,97 8,15 (2,15)
CITIC Industrial Bank 1,27 0,53 1,01 2,81
China Everbright Bank 1,60 -0,72 1,25 2,14
China Merchants Bank -0,32 -0,10 1,55 1,14
China Minsheng Bank -0,66 0,26 1,44 1,05
Hua Xia Bank 0,04 0,00 1,70 1,74
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank -0,46 -0,18 1,23 0,59
Shenzhen Development Bank 0,76 -0,11 0,77 1,42
Industrial Bank -0,29 0,26 1,04 1,01
Guangdong Development Bank 3,54 0,28 1,48 5,30
Total 25,33 (19,33)
Author's own calculations
4 This bank has sold 6 billion USD to an AMC in 2004. The calculations have been done without taking into account
this fact so if we substract the 6 billion USD, recapitalization needs for Bank of Communications and total JSCBs are
the values in brackets (2,15 and 19,33 billion USD, respectively).
1 Recapitalization needs are calculated as the difference between the actual level of NPLs and the necessary level to
achieve the objective value of 4% for the ratio NPL/loans established by the CBRC for BOC and CCB at 2005.
2 Recapitalization needs are calculated as the difference between the actual level of provisions and the necessary level
to achieve the objective value of 70% for the ratio provisions/NPL established by the CBRC for BOC and CCB at 2005.
We assume that the banks modify their NPLs before their provisions so the necessary level of provisions is calculated
over the objective NPLs.   
3 Recapitalization needs are calculated as the difference between the actual level of equity and the necessary level to
achieve the objective value of 6% for the ratio equity/assets established by the CBRC for BOC and CCB at 2005.
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• Graph A-3. Contribution to the ROAE growth rate 
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Appendix 2. Institutional setting of the Chinese banking system21 
Until 1979, China had a monobank financial system, as other centrally planned economies. 
The People’s Bank of China (PBC) was the only bank and, therefore, in charge of a large 
number of issues, such as the conduct of monetary policy, exchange policy, foreign reserve 
management, deposit-taking, commercial lending activities, and the financing of development 
projects. The introduction of a two-tier banking system in 1979 was the first milestone in the 
modernization of the Chinese financial system. 
 
Today China’s banking sector counts with two regulatory institutions, the central 
bank (PBC) and the China Banking and Regulatory Commission (CBRC), both ultimately 
overseen by the State Council (the cabinet), and the rest of the financial system.  
 
The PBC is currently in charge of the monetary policy and the liquidity of the financial 
system. It aims at promoting economic growth and price stability. The PBC manages the 
interest rate bands for loans and deposits, since interest rates are not fully liberalized yet, 
the reserve requirements and other instruments affecting banks’ liquidity. The PBC also 
monitors and regulates the credit expansion of a large share of the banking system.  
 
The CBRC was established in April 2003 to take over the regulatory and supervisory 
functions of the banking sector so that the PBC could concentrate on monetary 
policy matters. Its objectives include protecting consumers and depositors, maintaining the 
stability in the banking system, enhancing banks competitiveness, encouraging competition, 
educating the public on the role of finance and eradicating financial crime. To this end, it 
focuses on the strength of financial institutions, capital adequacy issues, and the restructuring 
of the banking sector. 
 
There is also a number of non-bank financial institutions in the Chinese banking 
system. The main ones are the Trust and Investment Corporations, created in the 1980s 
to support the development of the private sector and to provide financing outside the credit 
quotas imposed to commercial banks. Some TICs act as the investment instrument of local 
or provincial governments. Some others are intermediaries of international funds (through 
bond issues or syndicated medium and long term loans) to finance local companies and 
infrastructure and construction projects. Other important non-bank financial institutions are 
Asset Management Companies (AMCs), established in 1999 to receive the NPLs from 
the state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) and recover them through different asset 
resolution techniques. Securities companies have played an important role in the 
development of the stock exchanges since the 1990s. Their ownership has become 
more diversified with an increasing participation of the private sector. Insurance companies, 
in turn, are basically in state hands although most of the newly created companies are 
joint-stock ones and have shifted their focus from market share to economic return. Since 
China’s World Trade Organization (WTO) entry, foreign companies have expressed great 
interest in the Chinese insurance sector. 
 
The core of the Chinese financial system, the banking system, includes four 
large SOCBs, three policy lending banks and a large number of other commercial banks, 
credit cooperatives and financial institutions. Among the commercial banks, there are 
                                                                          
21. Drawn from García Herrero and Santabárbara (2004). 
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eleven joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs), which were initially created to provide 
specialized product niches but now offer a full range of financial services. At the local 
level, there are more than 110 city commercial banks (CCBs), 1,000 urban credit 
cooperatives (UCCs), and 35,000 rural credit cooperatives (RCCs) providing basic banking 
services. 
 
Chart A-2-1. Structure of the Chinese financial system 
Policy Lending 
Banks (3)
Other Commercial 
Banks 
(123)
State-Owned 
Commercial Banks 
(SOCBs) (4)
Foreign Banks (191)
 Agriculture Development Bank of China
 Export Import Bank of China
 China Development Bank
 Joint-stock Commercial Banks (JSCBs) (11)
 City Commercial Banks (CCBs) (112)
 Agricultural Bank of China (ABC)
 Bank of China (BoC)
 China Construction Bank (ChCB)
 Industrial and Commercial Bank (ICB)
Trust and 
Investment 
Corporations 
(TICs)
Credit Cooperatives 
(around 36,000)
 Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs) (around 35,000)
 Urban Credit Cooperatives (UCCs) (around 1,000)
 Branches (157)
 Sub-branches 
 Subsidiaries 
Banking institutions
Asset 
Management 
Companies 
(AMCs)
Securities 
companies
Insurance 
companies
Non-bank financial institutions
The People’s 
Bank of China 
(PBC)
China Banking 
Regulatory 
Commission 
(CBRC)
Regulatory institutions
 
 
The four SOCBs22, the Agricultural Bank of China, the Bank of China, the China 
Construction Bank, and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, were established in 
the 1980s. They were assigned sector policy objectives, previously in the hands of the PBC 
with the monobank system. In 1994, with the creation of the policy lending banks, their 
responsibilities were restricted to commercial purposes. Although their assets have fallen in 
the last two decades (from 72% of total assets in the banking system in 1994 to 55% at the 
end of 2004), they are still very large. In fact, they are among the biggest banks in the world, 
                                                                          
22. In the process of establishing a two-tier banking system, the government in 1979 first removed the monopolistic 
position of the PBC by establishing the Agricultural Bank of China, the Bank of China and the China Construction Bank. 
The Agricultural Bank of China’s objective was to foster rural banking business and to take the supervisory authority of a 
network of rural credit cooperatives that had been providing small-scale rural banking. The Bank of China was assigned 
foreign currency transactions, while the China Construction Bank focused on the construction sector. The government 
completed a two-tier banking system by removing commercial banking activities from the PBC and transferring them to 
the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the fourth specialized bank, established in 1984. 
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with total assets in above of USD 2,000 billion and an extensive branch network (with a total 
of 42,000 offices) and over 700,000 employees at the end of 2002. 
 
Three policy lending banks were created in 1994 to carry out the development 
policies previously assigned to the SOCBs and hold about 10% of total bank assets. These 
are the Agricultural Development Bank, the China Development Bank, and the Export-Import 
Bank of China. Their main objectives are agricultural development, national infrastructure 
and foreign trade, respectively, with special attention to the poorer western and central 
regions. Policy lending banks fund themselves through central bank loans, government 
deposits and the issuance of government-guaranteed deposits held by commercial banks. 
They also lend extensively to the government. Even more than in the case of SOCBs, 
profitability is only a residual objective for their managers. 
 
There are a number of other commercial banks in the Chinese banking system, 
with a diverse ownership structure and geographical scope. Part of them has been used as 
an experiment for the liberalization process of the financial system and others are specialized 
in some market niches. There are two main groups: joint-stock commercial banks and city 
commercial banks: 
 
Joint-stock commercial banks (JSBCs) are partially owned by local governments 
and SOEs, and sometimes by the private sector. There are currently eleven banks –five of 
which listed on local stock market– and account for 15% of total bank assets. The biggest 
ones are Bank of Communications, China Minsheng Bank23, China Everbright Bank, China 
Merchants Bank, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank and Shenzen Development Bank. 
The JSCBs finance small SOEs and firms with partial private ownership, including small and 
medium size enterprises (SMEs). They maintain much smaller branch networks than SOCBs, 
typically confined to the region of origin or to the fast growing coastal area, although they are 
generally allowed to operate at the national level. These banks are the most market oriented, 
with better governance and management and have experienced the fastest expansion in the 
last few years. 
 
Since the mid-1990s, city commercial banks (CCBs) have been created by 
restructuring and consolidating UCCs. There are currently 112, accounting for about 5% of 
total assets in 2004. Their capital is in the hands of urban enterprises and local governments. 
They are not allowed to operate at the national or regional scale unlike the JSCBs, which is 
their major competitive disadvantage. Finally, CCBs lend to small and medium size 
enterprises, collective and local residents in their municipalities. 
 
Rural and urban credit cooperatives were established in the 1980s as a 
mechanism to diversify the financial system and to finance projects in areas where resources 
were scarce. They typically attract deposits from rural areas or small towns and provide credit 
to small and medium-sized enterprises or peasants, a good part of which is subsidized. 
In fact, their lending policies are subject to the control of the local public authorities As of 
June 2003, there were about 35,000 RCCs, providing 80% of rural finance, and 1,000 UCCs. 
Their share of assets was 10.4% as of end-2004, marking a steady reduction since 1995 
(with 14.3% of total bank assets). This is mainly due to their inability to expand lending even if 
their deposits continue to expand. Nowadays, rural credit cooperatives are more important 
and numerous than urban ones, after the consolidation of the latter into city commercial 
                                                                          
23. China Minsheng Bank is the only one fully privately owned. It focuses on lending to the private sector, including joint 
ventures with foreign partners. 
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banks. Finally, RCCs are the worst performing financial institutions in China, with very poor 
governance and the highest NPL ratios. 
 
Foreign banks play a very limited role in the Chinese banking system. As of 
September 2003, there were 191 licensed foreign banking institutions, among which 157 
are branches, 11 sub-branches and 15 subsidiaries incorporated locally with 8 branches24. 
They hold 0.3% of the local currency lending market and around 13% in the foreign currency 
lending market; all in all about 1.5% of total bank assets. 
 
                                                                          
24. Ping (2003). 
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